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RED FLAG LAWS AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: 
ANALYZING PROPOSED UTAH LEGISLATION 
 




In April 2020, Virginia became the most recent state to enact a so-called “red 
flag law,” which will permit law enforcement to seize firearms from those deemed 
to pose a threat to themselves or others.1 Laws like these have generated 
controversy.2 When a red flag law was passed in Colorado in 2019, many counties 
across the state formally opposed it, and several sheriffs stated they would not 
enforce it.3 Despite their controversial nature, red flag laws have experienced a 
recent surge in popularity,4 and, to some extent, are even receiving bipartisan 
 
* © 2021 John R. Richardson. John Richardson graduated from the S.J. Quinney 
College of Law at the University of Utah in 2021. He previously graduated Phi Beta Kappa 
with Bachelor of Science and Bachelor of Arts degrees from the University of Utah. John 
wishes to thank Professors Daniel Levin, Robert B. Keiter, and Clifford Rosky for their 
valuable mentorship and for inspiring an interest in constitutional law. 
1 Veronica Stracqualursi, Virginia Governor Signs Background Checks, ‘Red Flag’ and 
Other Gun Control Bills into Law, CNN (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/10/ 
politics/ralph-northam-signs-gun-bills/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GVX-HRJ2]; Ryan W. 
Miller, Virginia Lawmakers Advance Gun Control Bills, Including ‘Red Flag’ Law, Month 
After Pro-Gun Rally, USA TODAY (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2020/02/27/virginia-lawmakers-pass-gun-control-bills-red-flag-law/4854818002/ 
[https://perma.cc/SL2A-LTCX]. 
2 See Miller, supra note 1. 
3 Gregg Re, Colorado Enacts ‘Red Flag’ Law to Seize Guns from Those Deemed 
Dangerous, Prompting Backlash, FOX NEWS (Apr. 14, 2019), foxnewspolitics/sheriff-fires-
back-after-enacts-to-seize-guns-from-individuals-deemed-dangerous [https://perma.cc/5M 
WG-N5KW]. 
4 Ryan J. Foley, Nine States Have Passed ‘Red Flag’ Gun Seizure Laws in Year Since 
Parkland Shooting, CLAIMS J. (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/nation 
al/2019/02/14/289277.htm [https://perma.cc/4QMA-KHJ3]. 
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support.5 While advocacy groups have raised questions about their constitutionality,6 
there have been remarkably few constitutional challenges to these statutes.7  
In this Note, I analyze the validity of criticism against red flag laws based on 
procedural due process. I proceed as follows: In Part I, I discuss the background of 
red flag laws, the different versions passed among states, and the few constitutional 
challenges brought thus far. In Part II, I analyze the statutes’ validity under federal 
due process standards. I then specifically examine proposed Utah bills that failed to 
pass in previous legislative sessions. While providing recommendations, I argue that 
the legislation would likely pass constitutional muster. In Part III, I conclude that 
red flag laws are generally constitutional under a procedural due process theory but 
review the key characteristics that make some versions more or less constitutionally 
problematic. 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 
A.  History and Differences Among the States 
 
The nation’s oldest red flag law went into effect in 1999 after a mass shooting 
in Connecticut’s state lottery office.8 By February 2018, just before the Stoneman 
Douglas High School shooting in which a mentally troubled teenager killed 
seventeen people in Parkland, Florida, only four more states had passed similar 
laws.9 As of June 2021, nineteen states and the District of Columbia have passed red 
flag laws.10 
 
5 Margaret Hartmann, Why ‘Red Flag Laws’ Are Gaining Bipartisan Support After 
Parkland, N.Y. MAG.: INTELLIGENCER (Feb. 21, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018 
/02/red-flag-laws-draw-more-bipartisan-support-after-parkland.html [https://perma.cc/3T45 
-4CKL] (naming “a handful of Republicans . . . pointing to red flag laws as the type of gun 
control they could support”). 
6 See, e.g., Benjamin Mueller, Limiting Access to Guns for Mentally Ill Is Complicated, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/gun-access-mentally-
ill.html [https://perma.cc/8NFR-J7ZX] (noting that both the NRA and ACLU opposed 
efforts to expand the list of those who could petition for restraining orders under California 
red flag law). 
7 Meagan Flynn, A Colorado Sheriff Would Rather Go to Jail than Seize Firearms 
Under State’s Red-Flag Law, He Says, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.washington 
post.com/nation/2019/04/02/colorado-sheriff-would-rather-go-jail-than-seize-firearms-und 
er-states-red-flag-law-he-says/?utm_term=.08931f2d1ca2 [https://perma.cc/JD47-U2HX] 
(stating that none of the jurisdictions that have passed red-flag laws “have run into serious 
legal challenges”). 
8 Foley, supra note 4. 
9 Id. 
10 The states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Extreme Risk Protection Orders, 
GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-
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Each red flag law allows a specified group of individuals to petition a court for 
an Extreme Risk Protection Order.11 This protection order is then used to confiscate 
any firearm in the respondent’s possession and, in most cases, to prevent him or her 
from purchasing firearms throughout the duration of the order.12 Differences among 
state red flag laws include the scope of who may petition for an order, the standard 
of proof required for such an order to be issued, and the duration of the order.13 Some 
states only allow law enforcement or other state officers to petition the court for a 
protection order.14 Most states also allow family or household members to petition,15 
and a few allow other individuals—like mental or medical health professionals,16 
school teachers and administrators,17 and employers and coworkers,18—to do so. 
Illinois also has a law that allows anybody to complain to a circuit court that a person 
who possesses a firearm has threatened to use it illegally.19 Then, if the court is 
satisfied that there is “any danger of such illegal use of firearms,” it issues a warrant 
requiring that person’s arrest and the seizure of any firearm in her possession.20 
In each state with a red flag law, protection orders may be issued in two ways: 
1) ex parte without notice to the respondent, or 2) after notice and a hearing.21 When 
orders are issued ex parte, respondents are entitled to a subsequent hearing to 
determine whether the order should be extended or the weapons returned.22 For ex 
parte orders, most states require the petitioner to meet a probable, reasonable, or 
 





14 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(a) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(2)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2(1) (LexisNexis 2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40-17-5(a) (LexisNexis 2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-3(a) (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13 § 4053(a) (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.13(a) (2020). 
15 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18150(a), 18170 (Deering 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
14.5-104 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701(4), 7704(a) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 134-61, -64(a), -65(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); 430 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 67/5, /35(a), /40(a) (LexisNexis 2019); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY §§ 5-
601(e), -603(a), -604(a) (LexisNexis 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121, 131R(a) 
(2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.560(2) (2019) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
2C:58-21, -23(a) (West 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340(2), 6341 (Consol. 2019); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 166.527(1) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.030(1) (LexisNexis 2019). 
16 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-61, -64(a), -65(a); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY 
§§ 5-601(e), -603(a), -604(a). 
17 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18170(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 6340(2), 
6341. 
18 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18170(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2020); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 134-61, -64(a), -65(a). 
19 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 165/1 (LexisNexis 2019). 
20 Id. 
21 Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 10. 
22 Id. 
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good cause standard of proof to show that the respondent is dangerous.23 California 
requires substantial likelihood,24 and four states use a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.25 Oregon requires clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard for 
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The standard of proof required for obtaining a final order is either 
preponderance of the evidence27 or, in most states, clear and convincing evidence.28 
 
23 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(4)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64(f) (LexisNexis 2019); 430 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 67/35(f) (LexisNexis 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2(3) (West 2019); MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-604(a)(1) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131T(a) 
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-5(D) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-23(e) (West 
2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 6342(1) (McKinney 2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4(a) 
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.13(A) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.050(3) (2019). 
24 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(b)(1)-(2) (Deering 2019). 
25 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103(3) (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 7703(b)(2) 
(2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.570(1) (LexisNexis 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 
4054(b)(1) (2019); see also supra note 3. 
26 See OR. REV. STAT. § 166.527(6)(a) (2019). 
27 See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-65(c); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131S(c); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-24(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-8(a); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
7.94.040(2). 
28 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18175(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-105(2); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 29-38c(d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 7704(d); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(3)(b); 430 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/40(f) (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-6(b) (2020); MD. CODE 
ANN. § 5-605(c)(1)(ii) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.580(1) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. 
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A final protection order lasts for up to one year in most states, at which point it 
expires unless the petitioner renews the order by proving at a hearing that the 
respondent is still dangerous.29 California recently expanded its law to allow a final 
protection order to last up to five years.30 In a couple of states, a protection order 
only lasts for six months,31 and in others, they last indefinitely.32 While an order is 
in effect, the states allow respondents to request a hearing to prove, by the same 
standard of proof required to obtain the order, that they are no longer dangerous.33 
If successful, the order ends before its default expiration date.34 Colorado’s law is 
unique in that it provides legal representation for gun owners throughout this 
process.35 
 
B.  Utah’s Failed Attempts to Pass Red Flag Gun Control Legislation 
 
In the wake of the Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in Parkland, 
Florida, Utah was one of the many states that considered various forms of gun 
control legislation.36 One version of a red flag law was sponsored in the 2018 
legislative session by Republican Representative Steve Handy of Layton, Utah, 
which failed in committee and never made it to a vote on the floor.37 Lawmakers 
did, however, create the Utah Safe Schools Commission to study and propose 
 
C.P.L.R. § 6343(2) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.530(3)(b) (2018); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-
8.3-5(a) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053(e)(1) (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
152.14(a). 
29 Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 10. 
30 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18175(e) (Deering 2019). 
31 See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/40(g) (2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053(e)(2) 
(2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.14(C.) (2020). 
32 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-6(c) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-24(d) 
(2019). 
33 Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 10. 
34 Id. 
35 Re, supra note 3. 
36 Bethany Rodgers, A Year After Parkland Shooting, Stand-Your-Ground Bill Moves 
Forward in Utah Legislature While Gun Control Measures Wait for Hearing, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/02/13/year-after-
parkland/ [https://perma.cc/RAN9-C4T5]. 
37 Taylor W. Anderson, Utah House Committee Rejects Bill that Would Restrict Gun 
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options to enhance gun safety at school campuses across the state.38 Surprising to 
some,39 one of the committee’s top proposals was red flag legislation.40 
In addition to recent shootings on school campuses and elsewhere, advocates 
of the measure say the legislation is also critical in addressing Utah’s high suicide 
rate,41 which is fifth in the nation.42 The vast majority of firearm deaths in Utah are 
suicides,43 and most suicides, by far, are carried out with a firearm.44 
In October of 2018, several months after the Utah Safe Schools Commission 
published its recommendations, Utah experienced its own tragedy when University 
of Utah student-athlete Lauren McCluskey was shot and killed on campus by a man 
she had previously dated, a felon and registered sex offender who had lied about his 
criminal history.45 This event renewed the call for the Utah legislature to take up 
 
38 Robert Gehrke, If We Want to Reduce Suicide in Utah, This Red Flag Bill Is a Good 
Place to Start, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.sltrib.com/news/2019/02/04/ 
gehrke-if-we-want-reduce/ [https://perma.cc/56CF-KXYC]. 
39 See, e.g., Robert Gehrke, Utah’s School Safety Commission Surprised Me—By 
Coming Up with Real Gun-Related Recommendations, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 25, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/06/22/gehrke-utahs-school-safety-commission-
surprised-me-by-coming-up-with-real-gun-related-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/JU 
7V-V9E3] (admitting that writer was wrong about the Commission, which he thought would 
“meet simply to create the illusion of action while the issue fades from headlines,” but instead 
provided recommendations that “were remarkably thorough and striking in the degree to 
which they were able to reach consensus on sensible steps that could prevent gun violence,” 
including a red flag law). 
40 Gehrke, supra note 38. The group also advised “making it a possible misdemeanor 
to keep unsecured firearms where youth could access them”; allocating more money for gun 
safes and public awareness of proper gun storage; universal background checks; and waiting 
periods to buy a firearm. Rodgers, supra note 36. 
41 See, e.g., Gehrke, supra note 38. 
42 UTAH DEP’T OF HEALTH, SUICIDE REPORT 2 (2018), https://health.utah.gov/vipp/pdf 
/Suicide/SuicideInUtah2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6AQ-HY36] [hereinafter SUICIDE 
REPORT]. 
43 HARV. T. H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, SUICIDE AND FIREARM INJURY IN UTAH: 
LINKING DATA TO SAVE LIVES 10 (2018), https://dsamh.utah.gov/pdf/suicide/Suicide%20 
and%20Firearm%20Injury%20in%20Utah%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/6JTQ-FS7A]; see also Bethany Rodgers, How Do You Fight Utah’s Suicide Problem? Utah 
Lawmakers to Consider Bills Focused on Gun Safety, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/01/07/combat-an-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/ 
RA4N-5S6P]. 
44 SUICIDE REPORT, supra note 42, at 4 (reporting that 49.7 percent of suicide deaths 
are carried out by firearm, which is almost double the rate of the second method, suffocation, 
at 25 percent). 
45 Artemis Moshtaghian, Chris Boyette & Darran Simon, College Track Star Once 
Dated Her Killer and Had Reported Him to Police, Authorities Say, CNN (Oct. 25, 2018, 
4:51 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/24/us/lauren-mccluskey-university-of-utah-fatal-
shooting/index.html [https://perma.cc/DHH9-5Q7Y]. 
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some sort of serious gun control legislation.46 The 2019 legislative session began 
just a few months after the McCluskey murder, and Rep. Handy once again 
introduced a version of the red flag law that stalled a year earlier.47 The bill did not 
fare much better the second time around and never got a public hearing.48  
Although Governor Herbert signaled measured openness to such legislation, 
he, like the legislature, was concerned about the bill’s due process implications.49 
He stated that red flag laws are “good in concept” because nobody wants “to have 
guns and weapons in the hands of somebody who is mentally unstable.”50 But he 
also warned that the law must not employ a “haphazard approach of taking away 
somebody’s guns because of some accusation.”51 In the end, the Utah legislature’s 
position seemed to be that it would be more effective to improve enforcement of gun 
laws already on the books rather than pass new ones.52 Finally, in the 2020 legislative 
session, three separate red flag bills were introduced but, once again, were not 
enacted.53 These will be discussed in Part III.  
 
46 Julia Ritchey, Utah Democrats Prepare Slate of Gun Reform Bills, with One Backed 
by Mother of Slain Ute Athlete, KUER (Dec. 24, 2018, 6:00 AM) 
https://www.kuer.org/post/utah-democrats-prepare-slate-gun-reform-bills-one-backed-
mother-slain-ute-athlete#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/D9XB-EEH8]. 
47 Gehrke, supra note 38. The proposed red flag law is not to be confused with 
“Lauren’s Law,” so named in honor of McCluskey. That bill would have created a cause of 
action against gun owners who lend a firearm to another person who in turn uses it to commit 
a violent felony. That law never received committee approval. Emily Ashcraft, Second Utah 
House Committee Rejects ‘Lauren’s Law,’ DESERET NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019, 7:35 PM), 
https://www.deseret.com/2019/3/11/20668065/second-utah-house-committee-rejects-lauren 
-s-law [https://perma.cc/9KUL-CL8Q]. 
48 Nicole Nixon, Gov. Herbert Calls for ‘Open and Frank’ Discussion on Gun Control 
Measures, KUER (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:09 AM), https://www.kuer.org/post/gov-herbert-calls-
open-and-frank-discussion-gun-control-measures#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/SE6V-UFZF]. 
49 Katie McKellar, House OKs Resolution Saying Utah’s Gun Laws Are Enough, 
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 14, 2019, 5:59 PM), https://www.deseret.com/2019/2/14/20665872/ 
house-oks-resolution-saying-utah-s-gun-laws-are-enough [https://perma.cc/MZN5-XPF5]. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. Further explaining his due process concerns, Governor Herbert stated that “[w]e 
could certainly have safer streets if we took away people’s freedoms and liberties. I don’t 
know that we want to do that.” Id. 
52 Id. (reporting that the Utah House of Representatives had approved a nonbinding 
resolution recognizing “that the best manner to protect the vulnerable without infringing on 
the right of the people to bear arms is to enforce the laws already found in Utah code”). Rep. 
Handy was the only Republican to vote against the resolution, arguing that it sent the wrong 
message. Id. 
53 H.B. 229; H.B. 460; S.B. 246. H.B. 229; H.B. 460; S.B. 246. H.B. 229; H.B. 460; 
S.B. 246. Extreme Risk Protection Order, H.B. 229, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0229.html [https://perma.cc/TVZ4-DZD6]; Firearm 
Removal Amendments, H.B. 460, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), https://le.utah. 
gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0460.html [https://perma.cc/2B3Q-KVT2]; Extreme Risk 
Protection Order Requirements, S.B. 246, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/SB0246.html [https://perma.cc/DUH4-U3YZ]. 
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C.  Constitutional Challenges 
 
Three jurisdictions—Indiana, Connecticut, and Florida—have heard challenges 
to red flag laws on constitutional grounds. Decisions have been issued in those 
states’ intermediate courts, each finding the red flag law constitutional.54 Each case 
is discussed below in the order in which it was decided. 
 
1.  Indiana Challenge: Redington v. State 
 
In the first case, police in Indiana seized forty-eight firearms from the home of 
the plaintiff, Redington, who had exhibited suspicious behavior and, in the opinion 
of a doctor who testified in the case, suffered from schizotypal, a personality disorder 
with “a flavor of schizophrenia.”55 The court found that the State had proved by clear 
and convincing evidence that Redington was dangerous under the red flag statute 
and ordered the police to retain his firearms.56 Redington challenged the validity of 
the statute under Article 1, Section 32 of the Indiana Constitution, which guarantees 
the right to bear arms for purposes of defense.57 He also challenged the application 
of the statute as an unlawful taking of his property without just compensation58 and 
on vagueness grounds.59 Although the court recognized that the right to bear arms 
for self-defense was a core value,60 that right was not materially burdened because 
the statute provided Redington with a mechanism to potentially recover his firearms 
and, alternatively, because Redington’s possession of the weapons threatened 
particularized harm.61 Further, the court did not recognize the application of the 
statute to Redington as a taking, but instead found it to be a valid exercise of the 
police power.62 The court also found that the statute was not void for vagueness.63 
 
2.  Connecticut Challenge: Hope v. State 
 
In the Connecticut case, the plaintiff, Donald Hope, had, according to his wife, 
become “increasingly delusional.”64 At Hope’s hearing, the trial court found that 
“the evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff posed an imminent risk of physical 
 
54 See Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 280 So. 3d 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); 
Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016); Redington v. State, 992 N.E.2d 823 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
55 Redington, 992 N.E.2d at 823, 825–28. 
56 Id. at 828. 
57 Id. at 830. 
58 Id. at 835. 
59 Id. at 838. 
60 Id. at 833. 
61 Id. at 834. 
62 Id. at 836. 
63 Id. at 839. 
64 Hope v. State, 133 A.3d 519, 523 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). 
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harm to himself or others” and ordered his weapons to remain seized for one year.65 
Hope challenged the Connecticut red flag law under the Second Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution.66 The court held that the statute “does not implicate the Second 
Amendment [because] it does not restrict the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of their homes,”67 as guaranteed by District of 
Columbia v. Heller.68 Instead, the statute, which only restricted the rights of those 
who posed a risk of imminent physical harm, was an example of a “longstanding 
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measure.’”69 
 
3.  Florida Challenge: Davis v. Gilchrist County Sheriff’s Office 
 
In the Florida case, the trial court granted a risk protection order against a police 
officer, Davis, who had confessed to his supervisor and a couple of other officers 
that he desired to use his police-issued gun to shoot another police officer.70 
Believing that his girlfriend had been having an affair with the target officer, Davis 
stated that he wanted to “shoot him in the face, eat his food, and wait for [law 
enforcement] to pick [him] up.”71 On appeal, Davis argued that the red flag law was 
facially unconstitutional because it was vague, overbroad, and because it violated 
substantive due process.72 He also argued that the law was unconstitutional as 
applied to him, but the court determined that he had waived an as-applied challenge 
by not preserving it at the trial level.73 
According to Davis, the red flag law was unconstitutionally vague because it 
left “too much to the discretion of the trial court and law enforcement in 
determining,” among other things, when a person poses a “significant danger” to 
himself or others.74 The court rejected the idea that the term was vague, interpreting 
the word “significant” consistently “with standard dictionary synonyms,” and 
arguing that it is no more vague than the word “imminent” as used in other statutes.75 
Davis also argued that the law was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad 
because it was “untethered to any central idea, subject, or danger,” citing the broad 
list of evidence that courts are permitted to consider when making risk protection 
order determinations.76 The court disagreed, pointing to the state legislature’s 
 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 521–22. 
67 Id. at 524. 
68 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
69 Hope, 133 A.3d at 524 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26). 
70 Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 280 So. 3d 524, 528–29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019). 
71 Id. at 529. 
72 Id. at 531. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 532. 
75 Id. 
76 Davis, 280 So. 3d at 532. 
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explanation for the law: “to comprehensively address the crisis of gun violence, 
including but not limited to, gun violence on school campuses.”77 
Finally, Davis argued that the law violated substantive due process by 
punishing “entirely innocent activity.”78 According to the court, however, the 
statute’s purpose was not punitive but preventative.79 It also noted that of the fifteen 
nonexclusive “activities” courts could consider, only three could be considered 
innocent: being seriously mentally ill, abusing alcohol, and recently acquiring 
firearms or ammunition.80 Those activities, moreover, were mere factors that courts 
were to consider—within the specific context of the threat of gun violence—before 
issuing a risk protection order.81 
In the end, Davis failed to meet his “high burden” of proving that “no set of 
circumstances exists in which the statute can be considered constitutionally valid.”82 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
As previously shown, due process is one potential ground for challenging red 
flag laws. In the Indiana and Florida cases described above, the respective red flag 
laws were challenged on such grounds. The challengers specifically argued that they 
were unconstitutionally vague and violative of substantive due process.83 
Additionally, the procedural safeguards guaranteed (or not) by the various red flag 
laws are one concern among advocacy groups. Although the National Rifle 
Association (NRA) gained attention when it signaled some degree of openness to 
red flag laws,84 the organization has yet to support any specific measure and has 
 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 532–33. 
79 Id. at 533. Although the purpose of the statute may certainly be considered 
preventative, that does not mean it is not punitive as well, especially from the respondent’s 
point of view. In fact, earlier in its opinion, the court seemed to acknowledge that the red 
flag law impairs the exercise of a fundamental right. Id. at 531–32. In the immediate case, it 
is easy to understand that Davis likely felt that he was being punished for the threats, serious 
or not, that he uttered against his fellow police officer.  
80 Id. at 533. 
81 Id. 
82 Davis, 280 So. 3d at 532–33. 
83 Supra Sections I.B.1, I.B.3. 
84 See Nicole Gaudiano, Under Pressure, NRA Voices Support for Gun Violence 
Restraining Orders, USA TODAY (Mar. 19, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/politics/2018/03/19/under-pressure-nra-voices-support-gun-violence-restraining 
-orders/433716002/ [https://perma.cc/JGJ7-VTEQ] (quoting an NRA spokeswoman who, 
unable to point to any specific bill the organization supports, nevertheless expressed 
confidence that “there will be a bill introduced that provides adequate due process while 
ensuring that people who are a danger to themselves or others don’t have access to 
firearms.”). Some have questioned the NRA’s sincerity in suggesting it is open to any sort 
of red flag gun legislation. Connecticut Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal commented 
on the NRA’s opposition to his proposed federal red flag law, saying, “[t]he NRA wants a 
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worked to defeat them in multiple states85 One of the NRA’s principal arguments 
against most red flag laws is that they lack “basic due process protections” and are 
“ripe for abuse.”86 The NRA is not alone. The American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) of Rhode Island published an analysis criticizing the lack of due process 
protections provided in Rhode Island’s red flag legislation before it was passed.87 
Given these concerns, red flag laws might further be challenged on procedural due 
process grounds. This Note will discuss the validity of these groups’ due process 
concerns by addressing potential problems with postdeprivation hearings and the 
meaningfulness of hearings under current red flag laws. 
 
A.  Postdeprivation Hearings 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard . . . ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner.’”88 As to meaningful time, critics of red flag laws argue that “[t]he major 
due process concern . . . is that they allow a person to be deprived of property (a 
gun) and liberty (their Second Amendment right) before they are granted an 
opportunity to be heard.”89 From this point of view, red flag laws implicate both 
property and liberty interests. In both instances, the law prefers that a hearing take 
place before a deprivation occurs.90 But the Supreme Court has been forgiving of 
deprivations of property without a predeprivation hearing so long as an adequate 
postdeprivation remedy is available that “provide[s] either the property’s prompt 
return or an equivalent compensation.”91 Viewed as depriving respondents of a 
property interest, then, ex parte protection orders that are followed quickly by a 
hearing to determine whether the order should be continued are likely 
constitutionally sound.  
 
Catch-22: oppose a federal statute, supposedly relying on the states, and then oppose state 
laws, as it has consistently done.” Id.  
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF R.I., AN ANALYSIS OF 18-H 7688 AND 18-S 2492, 
RELATING TO EXTREME RISK PROTECTIVE ORDERS (Mar. 2018), riaclu.org/images/uploads/ 
180302_analysis_RedFlagsLegislation.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E42-745B]. 
88 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)). 
89 Travis Dunn, Red Flag Laws and the Consequences of Good Intentions, 
WHO.WHAT.WHY. (Mar. 18, 2019), https://whowhatwhy.org/2019/03/18/laws-and-the-
consequences-of-good-intentions/ [https://perma.cc/2FTB-ULV4] (emphasis added) 
(quoting John W. Whitehead, president of The Rutherford Institute).  
90 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540. 
91 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 315 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also 
Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540 (“[Where] only property rights are involved, mere postponement of 
the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate 
judicial determination of liability is adequate.” (quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 
589, 596–97 (1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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The more difficult question arises if protection orders are considered 
deprivations of liberty. At least one Supreme Court justice has suggested that where 
a loss of liberty occurs, “any postdeprivation state procedure is merely a remedy; 
because it does not provide the predeprivation process that is ‘due,’ it does not avoid 
the constitutional violation.”92 Additionally, the Court has purported to uphold the 
adequacy of postdeprivation hearings “[w]here only property rights are 
involved. . . .”93 On the other hand, the Court has in other instances rejected the 
notion that postdeprivation hearings are categorically inadequate for deprivations of 
liberty interests.94 
One situation in which postdeprivation remedies might satisfy procedural due 
process requirements is where a predeprivation hearing “is unduly burdensome in 
proportion to the liberty interest at stake.”95 This, of course, depends upon the nature 
of the liberty interest, to be discussed below. More directly relevant is the rule that, 
“[i]n an emergency situation, the government may take away property or liberty, so 
long as postdeprivation notice and a hearing are provided.”96 Given these rules, red 
flag laws that require the petitioner to show that an individual is imminently 
dangerous before a court may grant an ex parte protection order are more likely to 
pass constitutional muster than those that do not. At least two states, Massachusetts 
and New York, have no such requirement.97  
 
92 Albright, 510 U.S. at 315–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540 (emphasis added) (citing Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 
589, 596–97 (1931)). 
94 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990) (“We . . . do not find support 
in precedent for a categorial distinction between a deprivation of liberty and one of 
property.”); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (“The dichotomy 
between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.”). 
95 Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 132. 
96 Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). 
97 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131T(a) (LexisNexis 2019); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 
6342(1) (Consol. 2019). The states that do require some level of imminence before issuing 
an ex parte order apply slightly different standards and employ varied terminology. Some 
explicitly require imminent danger, while others employ what seem to be looser standards, 
like danger “in the near future,” which might be more problematic. CAL. PENAL CODE § 
18150(b) (Deering 2019) (substantial likelihood of significant danger in the near future); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-103(3) (2019) (significant risk of injury in the near future by 
preponderance of the evidence); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(a) (2019) (risk of imminent 
personal injury by probable cause and no reasonable alternative to prevent such injury); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 7703(d) (2019) (immediate and present danger by preponderance of the 
evidence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(4)(c) (LexisNexis 2019) (significant danger in the 
near future by reasonable cause); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64(ccf) (LexisNexis 2019) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2020) (imminent danger by probable cause); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
67/35(ggf) (LexisNexis 2019) (immediate and present danger by probable cause); IND. CODE 
ANN. §§ 35-47-14-1(a), 35-47-14-2(a) (LexisNexis 2019) (imminent risk of injury by 
probable cause); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-601(e) (LexisNexis 2019) (immediate 
and present danger on reasonable grounds); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.570(1)(a) 
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B.  Meaningful Hearings 
 
To satisfy due process, states must provide the opportunity not only to be heard 
at a meaningful time, but also in a meaningful manner.98 
 
[G]enerally[, this] requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the 
private interest that will be affected . . . ; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation . . . through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
government’s interest [in enforcing the deprivation].99  
 
Because it is clear that the government has “an unqualified interest in the 
preservation of human life,”100 the remainder of this section will examine more 
closely the first and second factors. 
 
1.  Affected Private Interest 
 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,101 the Court found that the Second 
Amendment to the Constitution preserves “the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”102 That case did not purport to 
interfere with, among other gun control laws, “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”103 However, red flag laws 
are not limited in application to the mentally ill,104 and they “allow[] a court to 
intervene in potentially major and intrusive ways on a person’s liberty and property 
interests without any indication . . . that the person has engaged in any criminal 
conduct . . . .”105 
 
(LexisNexis 2020) (imminent risk of personal injury by preponderance of the evidence and 
no less restrictive options available); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-23(e) (West 2019) (immediate 
and present danger by good cause); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-6(a) (LexisNexis 2020) 
(imminent danger by probable cause); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.527(6) (2019) (clear and 
convincing evidence of risk in near future); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4(a) (2019) (significant 
danger of imminent personal injury by probable cause); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 4054(b)(1) 
(2019) (imminent and extreme risk of harm by preponderance of the evidence); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-152.13(a) (substantial risk of personal injury in the near future by probable 
cause); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.94.050 (LexisNexis 2019) (significant danger in near 
future by reasonable cause). 
98 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981). 
99 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 
100 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990). 
101 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
102 Id. at 635. 
103 Id. at 626. 
104 Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 10 (providing examples of evidence 
courts use in determining whether a person is dangerous). 
105 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF R.I., supra note 87, at 3–4. 
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Assuming, then, that red flag laws do not fall within the category of 
presumptively valid gun control laws, it is still unclear what level of importance 
attaches to Second Amendment rights for purposes of weighing the private interest 
at stake. One indicator may be the level of scrutiny federal courts apply in Second 
Amendment cases.106 Because Heller provides little guidance, federal courts have 
varied in the level of scrutiny they apply to legislation facing legal challenge under 
the Second Amendment.107 The majority of courts have applied intermediate 
scrutiny, but others have applied strict scrutiny.108 Brown argues that intermediate 
scrutiny should apply.109 If intermediate scrutiny applies, it is more likely that the 
government’s interest will outweigh the private interest at stake, and Brown 
therefore concludes that red flag laws meet due process standards.110 That conclusion 
would be harder to reach in jurisdictions which apply strict scrutiny in Second 
Amendment cases. Brown’s conclusion also applies only to ex parte protection 
orders, which, he points out, “[are] of extremely short duration.”111 Final protection 
orders, of course, last much longer—indefinitely in some cases—thus magnifying 
the liberty interest at stake.112 
 
2.  Additional Procedural Safeguards 
 
The second factor in determining whether a hearing is meaningful is the 
probable value of additional safeguards.113 One proposal that may serve as an 
additional procedural safeguard is to provide counsel to respondents.114 Colorado’s 
red flag law does this,115 recognizing that “having to suddenly find a lawyer and pay 
the fees for an imminent court hearing can be very difficult for many people.”116 
While this may be sound policy, it is likely not neccessary to satisfy due process 
requirements because the right to counsel exists principally in criminal cases and 
applies in civil cases “only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses 
the litigation.”117 But because courts will look to whether procedural safeguards are 
 
106 Aaron Edward Brown, This Time I’ll Be Bulletproof: Using Ex Parte Firearm 





110 Id. at 196–98. 
111 Id. at 196. 
112 See supra Section I.A. 
113 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
114 Red Flag Laws: Examining Guidelines for State Action: Hearing Before the S. 
Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 19 (2019) (written testimony of David B. Kopel), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Kopel%20Testimony1 [https://perma.cc/ 
9SP3-KE3M] [hereinafter Red Flag Laws] (“Statutes should clearly specify how respondents 
are to be given clear written notice of their right to counsel.”). 
115 See supra Section I.A. 
116 Red Flag Laws, supra note 114, at 19. 
117 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 
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lacking in any procedural due process challenge, providing counsel to respondents 
can only increase a red flag law’s probability of surviving such a challenge. Further, 
as one might suspect, a respondent represented by counsel may be more likely to 
prevail in protection order proceedings than one who is not.118 
A simpler procedural safeguard to reduce the risk of erroneous deprivations is 
higher standard of proof at ex parte hearings, final hearings, or both.119 Although the 
respondent in Davis did not bring a procedural due process claim, the court viewed 
favorably certain procedural safeguards within Florida’s red flag law—its 
heightened “clear and convincing” standard for the issuance of final orders was 
among them.120 The court contrasted Florida’s standard with the State of 
Washington’s, which requires a “less stringent ‘preponderance of the evidence’ 
standard.”121 
Statutes requiring a petitioner to prove only that the respondent is dangerous by 
a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain a final protection order seem 
highly susceptible to a due process challenge. As one critic put it, “[i]n other words, 
there is just over a 50/50 chance of accuracy. Like the flip of a coin.”122 Whether the 
right to bear arms is deemed important or fundamental, the safer route is for states 
to do what the majority have done and require clear and convincing evidence from 
a petitioner before issuing a final order.123 New Jersey’s statute seems particularly 
problematic, as it requires only a preponderance of the evidence to burden the 
respondent’s Second Amendment right for an indefinite period of time.124 
Next, states can limit the categories of people who are eligible to petition the 
courts for protection orders. As mentioned previously, the majority of states only 
 
118 Matt Vasilogambros, Red Flag Laws Spur Debate over Due Process, PEW: 
STATELINE (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/ 
stateline/2019/09/04/red-flag-laws-spur-debate-over-due-process [https://perma.cc/LY3F-
T2JD]. As of September 2019, Florida courts had approved approximately 2,500 risk 
protection orders since the law took effect in early 2018. Id. According to one Florida defense 
attorney, Kendra Parris, who represents both clients subject to the state’s involuntary mental 
health treatment law and now the red flag gun law, the protection orders have become a 
“shiny new toy for law enforcement . . . filing them left and right.” Id. In discussing the value 
of legal representation in protection order proceedings, Parris argues that rather than actually 
finding “clear and convincing evidence” that respondents are dangerous, courts are 
essentially saying “[b]etter safe than sorry.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
119 Red Flag Laws, supra note 114, at 17–18. 
120 Davis v. Gilchrist Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 280 So. 3d 524, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019). 
121 Id. The other safeguards the court found significant were common among red flag 
laws, including a hearing within a short timeframe after an ex parte protection order has 
issued and a mechanism whereby a subject of an order may request early termination of that 
order. Id. The court also pointed to the limited duration of a final protection order (one year), 
which is most commonly the case among existing red flag laws. See supra Section I.A. and 
notes 28–31. 
122 Re, supra note 3. 
123 See supra Section I.A.  
124 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-24(d) (2019).  
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allow law enforcement officials and family members to petition.125 California has 
moved in the opposite direction, recently expanding its red flag law to allow 
teachers, school administrators, employers, and coworkers to do so.126 Signed into 
law in October 2019 by Governor Gavin Newsom,127 this expansion raises its own 
due process concerns, as it potentially subjects individuals to a deprivation of 
property and liberty through court proceedings initiated by those with whom they 
may be less intimately associated. This is, at least in part, why former Governor 
Jerry Brown vetoed such an expansion while in office.128 
The expanded group of eligible petitioners may be justified, however, because 
it still seems limited to persons who would know the respondent well. After all, 
Americans spend a significant portion of their time at their workplace.129 And, of 
course, not every potential violent criminal lives with or near family,130 so behavior 
tending to manifest a threat of violence might, without the expansion, go unnoticed 
and unreported. The concerns about an expanded group of eligible petitioners may 
also be mitigated by the fact that, regardless of who files a petition, all petitioners 
have to meet the same evidentiary burden that a close family member would have to 
meet in order to secure a protection order.131 But that burden may not be high at the 
initial stage or even a later stage,132 and it might be especially difficult for pro se 
 
125 See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text. 
126 Patrick McGreevy, After Mass Shootings, California Sets New Limits on Gun Buyers 
and Expands Firearm Seizure, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/calif 
ornia/story/2019-10-11/california-approves-gun-control-red-flag-laws [https://perma.cc/37 
5C-ADXT]. This bill also increased the duration of final protection orders from one year to 
a maximum of five. Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. Governor Brown argued that school employees and coworkers should work 
through a respondent’s family members if they believe a restraining order is necessary and 
that “law enforcement professionals and those closest to a family member are best situated 
to make these especially consequential decisions.” Id. 
129 See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey—2018 
Results 2 (June 19, 2019) (reporting that, among full-time workers, men worked an average 
of 8.2 hours per day while women worked an average of 7.9). 
130 How Are Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Linked?, PBS (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-are-mass-killings-and-domestic-violence-linked 
[https://perma.cc/PD67-BSU7] (exploring the correlation between domestic violence and 
mass killings but noting that “there is not always a presence of domestic violence,” partly 
because many mass killers live alone). 
131 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 18150(a), (b) (Deering 2019) (listing categories of 
individuals allowed to file a petition and stating that such petition must show a substantial 
likelihood that subject of petition poses a significant danger and that a protection order is 
necessary). 
132 See supra Section I.A. 
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respondents to rebut evidence that they are dangerous, even if such rebuttal evidence 
might exist.133 
Finally, states can add criminal penalties to help protect against false or 
frivolous petitions. Even in states where only family members and law enforcement 
may file petitions for protection orders, there are concerns that the system might be 
abused. For example, “[s]purned former partners or family members seeking 
revenge might ‘weaponize’ this tool.”134 Creating criminal penalties would be one 
of the more effective ways of deterring such conduct. 
 
C.  Procedural Due Process in Utah’s Proposed Red Flag Laws 
 
I conclude by reviewing the provisions of three red flag bills introduced in 
Utah’s 2020 general legislative session and applying the procedural due process 
analysis discussed in Parts A and B of this section. The three bills are H.B. 229 
(sponsored by Rep. Handy), H.B. 460 (sponsored by Rep. Briscoe), and S.B. 246 
(sponsored by Sen. Weiler). I suggest that Rep. Briscoe’s version is more 
problematic than the others but that, despite the concerns of many legislators and the 
governor, these bills are likely constitutionally sound. 
 
1.  Postdeprivation Hearings 
 
Like the red flag laws that have been enacted in other states, two of the three 
most recent versions of Utah’s proposed law provide a mechanism whereby a 
respondent’s firearms may be seized through an ex parte protection order before any 
hearing has taken place.135 Senator Weiler’s bill, however, provides no such 
procedure.136 Instead, any confiscation of firearms must take place after a hearing.137 
This virtually eliminates the procedural due process concerns present in the other 
versions of the bill and in the red flag laws of every other state. As far as the  other 
bills are concerned, in Section II.A., I argued that, because postdeprivation hearings 
are constitutionally disfavored, a petitioner should have to show that the respondent 
 
133 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 51 (1981), 
(Blackmun J., dissenting) (explaining pro se litigants are “more likely to be unaware of 
controlling legal standards and practices, and unskilled in garnering relevant facts, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that the typical case has been adequately presented.”). 
134 Vasilogambros, supra note 118 (quoting Dave Kopel). The Giffords Law Center, 
which promotes the adoption of red flag gun laws, recommends a penalty for false petitions 
as a key legislative element. Extreme Risk Protection Orders, supra note 10. 
135 See Extreme Risk Protection Order, H.B. 229, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. § 4 (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0229.html [https://perma.cc/TVZ4-DZD6]; Firearm 
Removal Amendments, H.B. 460, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. § 4 (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0460.html [https://perma.cc/4ZRY-YKPU]. 
136 See S.B. 246, 63rd§ 4, 2020 Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. § 4 (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/SB0246.html [https://perma.cc/DUH4-U3YZ]. 
137 See id. 
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poses some level of imminent danger. In this regard, the bills proposed in the 2020 
legislative session improve upon Rep. Handy’s 2019 bill. 
In 2019, H.B. 209 did not explicitly require a petitioner to demonstrate that a 
respondent was imminently dangerous, or even dangerous in the near future, in order 
for a court to issue an ex parte protection order.138 Instead, all the court had to find, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, was that the respondent posed “a serious risk of 
harm to himself, herself, or others.”139 But the bill did require that a court consider 
at least five factors before issuing the ex parte order, four of which were at least 
somewhat associated with the imminence of the threat.140 Those factors were: (1) 
whether “there has been a recent threat of violence, or act of violence, by the 
respondent toward himself, herself, or others, including the transmission of threats 
through electronic or digital means”141; (2) whether “the respondent is 
dangerous”142; (3) whether the respondent recently violated a protective order issued 
separately;143 and (4) whether “there has been a recent pattern of violent acts or 
threats by the respondent and other less restrictive alternatives either have been tried 
and found to be ineffective or are inadequate or inappropriate for the circumstances 
of the respondent.”144 
Unlike the 2019 bill, the 2020 bills require a court to make a specific 
determination that an individual either poses an imminent threat or a threat in the 
near future before it may issue an ex parte protection order. They do this by requiring 
the court to determine not that a respondent poses a serious risk of harm but that she 
is “dangerous.”145 And the bills define “dangerous” as presenting an “imminent” risk 
of injury or risk of injury in the near future.146 In making that determination, the new 
bills also require the court to consider the same five factors that the 2019 bill did.147 
 
138 See H.B. 209, 2019 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2019), https://le.utah.gov/~2019/bills/ 
static/HB0209.html [https://perma.cc/NK2C-QXNA]. 
139 See id. § 5. 
140 Id. § 4. 
141 Id. (emphasis added). 
142 Id. In the bill, a respondent may be found “dangerous” in one of two ways: first, if 
he or she “presents an imminent risk of personal injury to himself, herself, or to others,” or, 
second, if he or she presents “a risk of personal injury to him or herself or to another 
individual in the near future and is the subject of relevant personal knowledge that would 
give rise to a reasonable belief that the respondent has a propensity for violent conduct.” Id. 
§ 3. (emphasis added). 
143 Id. § 4. 
144 Id. (emphasis added). The other factor that must be considered is whether the 
respondent is otherwise restricted from possessing firearms. Id. 
145 H.B. 229, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. § 5 (Utah 2020), https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bill 
s/static/HB0229.html [https://perma.cc/TVZ4-DZD6]; H.B. 460, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. 
§ 5 (Utah 2020), https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0460.html [https://perma.cc/4ZRY 
-YKPU]. 
146 H.B. 229 § 3; H.B. 460 § 3. 
147 H.B. 220, § 4; H.B. 460 § 4. Though not constitutionally relevant, this leads to the 
circular result that, to determine whether an individual is dangerous, the court must consider, 
among other things, whether the individual is dangerous. 
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Given those factors, making explicit the requirement that a respondent pose an 
imminent threat of harm might make only a marginal difference constitutionally. 
But because postdeprivation hearings should be reserved for emergency 
situations,148 making this requirement explicit may secure the constitutionality of the 
bills’ ex parte order procedures and assuage the concerns of some of those who have 
expressed reservations about the previous bill’s due process protections.149 
The procedural due process concerns associated with ex parte protection orders 
are further diminished by the Utah bills’ heightened standard of proof a petitioner 
must meet to obtain an order. While most states require a petitioner to show 
probable, reasonable, or good cause that the respondent poses a threat,150 Rep. 
Handy’s and Rep. Briscoe’s bills require the petitioner to make her showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence.151 This is generally considered a higher standard than 
probable cause.152 
 
2.  Meaningful Hearings 
 
As previously explained, to determine whether a hearing is meaningful for 
purposes of procedural due process, courts must weigh the three Eldridge factors: 
(1) the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest in enforcing the 
deprivation.153 Once again, because the state has an “unqualified interest in the 
preservation of human life,”154 the remainder of this section will evaluate the 
affected private interest and the additional safeguards that the most recent bills have 
included to protect against erroneous deprivations. 
 
148 See Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380 (7th Cir. 1988). 
149 Further, although the court was required to consider the five factors outlined here, it 
was not limited by those factors. In both 2019 and 2020, the bills also state that a court may 
also consider other evidence, providing a second nonexhaustive list of factors. See H.B. 209 
§ 4; H.B. 229 § 4; H.B. 460 § 4. Given those additional considerations, not all of which are 
tied to imminence, it was conceivable under the 2019 version of the bill that a court could 
issue an ex parte protection order without making an explicit finding that the respondent was 
imminently dangerous. 
150 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-38c(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(4)(c) 
(LexisNexis 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-64(f) (LexisNexis 2019); 430 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 67/35(f) (LexisNexis 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-2(3) (West 2019); MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-604(a)(1) (West 2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131T(a) 
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-5(D) (West 2020); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-23(e) (West 
2018); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 6342(1) (McKinney 2020); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.3-4(a) 
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.13(A) (2020); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.94.050(3) (2019). 
151 H.B. 229 § 5; H.B. 460 § 5. 
152 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121 (1975) (explaining that a probable cause 
determination “does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that . . . a 
preponderance standard demands”). 
153 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.  
154 See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 282. 
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(a)  Affected Private Interest 
 
A search of Second Amendment cases reveals that the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals has yet to apply strict scrutiny to any challenged gun law. It has, instead, 
acknowledged that Heller did not specify “precisely what level of scrutiny a 
reviewing court must apply to a challenged law,” and has thus chosen to apply 
intermediate scrutiny.155 This suggests that, if a procedural due process challenge 
were to be brought against a potential red flag law in Utah, the private interest factor 
would not outweigh the government’s unqualified interest in the preservation of 
human life that it would use to justify a deprivation. 
 
(b)  Additional Procedural Safeguards 
 
Section II.B.2, supra, identified four additional procedural safeguards that 
might tip the scale in favor of red flag laws’ constitutionality when courts weigh the 
interests at stake. These were (1) providing counsel to respondents; (2) requiring 
higher standards for ex parte protection orders, final protection orders, or both; (3) 
limiting the categories of people who may petition for a protection order; and (4) 
implementing criminal penalties for petitions based on erroneous facts.156 Judging 
by these safeguards, Rep. Handy’s and Sen. Weiler’s are the stronger bills. 
First, none of the bills guarantee counsel to respondents.157 
Second, although each bill would implement the same standard for ex parte 
protective orders, they differ in the standard for issuing a final order.158 The Handy 
and Weiler bills both join the majority of states159 in requiring clear and convincing 
 
155 See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010). In Reese, a criminal 
defendant argued that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibited him from possessing a firearm 
while subject to a domestic protection order, violated his Second Amendment right to bear 
arms. Id. at 794. The court chose to apply intermediate scrutiny to the statute, comparing it 
to other statutes that had been evaluated under intermediate scrutiny in other circuits. Id. at 
801–02. One of those was the Third Circuit, which had concluded that “the Second 
Amendment can trigger more than one particular standard of scrutiny, depending, at least in 
part, upon the type of law challenged and the type of [Second Amendment restriction] at 
issue.” Id. at 801 (citing United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3rd Cir. 2010)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
156 See supra Section II.B.2. 
157 See H.B. 229, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0229.html [https://perma.cc/TVZ4-DZD6]; H.B. 
460, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/HB0460 
.html [https://perma.cc/4ZRY-YKPU]; S.B. 246, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/SB0246.html [https://perma.cc/DUH4-U3YZ]. 
158 See H.B. 229 § 4; H.B. 460 §4, S.B. 246 § 4. 
159 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 18175(b); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14.5-105(2); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 29-38c(d); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 7704(d); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401(3)(b); 430 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 67/40(f) (2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-14-6(b) (2020); MD. CODE 
ANN. § 5-605(c)(1)(ii) (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.580(1) (LexisNexis 2020); N.Y. 
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evidence that the respondent is dangerous.160 The Briscoe bill, on the other hand, 
maintains the preponderance of the evidence standard for both ex parte and final 
protective orders.161 This affects the meaningfulness of the hearing by increasing the 
chance that firearms are taken from an individual who is not in fact dangerous.162 
Third, the bills also differ in the categories of people that may petition the courts 
for a protection order. Again, Rep. Briscoe’s bill offers fewer protections than the 
other bills do. It is unique among the three bills in allowing any medical professional 
who has treated the respondent, in addition to law enforcement officials and family 
and household members, to seek a protection order.163 It also defines “family or 
household member” more broadly than the other bills to include persons “with one 
or more children in common with the respondent” as well as grandparents and 
persons who are or have acted as the respondent’s legal guardian.164 Because all 
petitioners must meet the same standard of proof regardless of their relationship with 
the respondent,165 a more expansive group of potential petitioners may not on its 
own present significant due process concerns—as long as the standard of proof is 
sufficient to mitigate the possibility of erroneous deprivation. But as previously 
discussed, Rep. Briscoe’s bill proposes a lower standard of proof for final orders 
than the other bills do, which would make it easier for individuals further removed 
from the respondent—and with less evidence—to successfully secure firearm 
removal. 
Fourth, two of the red flag bills carry certain penalties for providing false 
information in a petition: The Handy bill provides that “[a] petitioner who 
knowingly provides false information for the purpose of obtaining an ex parte 
extreme risk protective order or extreme risk protective order is guilty of a third 
degree felony.”166 This is a stringent penalty that may likely deter frivolous and 
malicious petitions, a key safeguard for potential respondents. The deterrent effect 
is enhanced by the requirement that “[f]orms provided by the court to file for an 
extreme risk protective order shall include a statement informing the petitioner that 
knowing falsification of any statement or information provided for the purpose of 
obtaining an ex parte order is a third degree felony.”167 In other words, petitioners 
will be aware of the consequences of filing a frivolous petition beforehand. 
The penalty associated with providing false information in Rep. Briscoe’s bill 
is less clear due to a contradiction in the bill’s text. The bill contains the same 
 
C.P.L.R. § 6343(2) (2019); OR. REV. STAT. § 166.530(3)(b) (2018); 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-
8.3-5(a) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4053(e)(1) (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
152.14(a). 
160 H.B. 229 § 5; S.B. 246 § 5. 
161 H.B. 460 § 5. 
162 The tradeoff, of course, is that a higher standard of proof increases the chance that a 
dangerous individual remains in possession of firearms. 
163 H.B. 460 § 4. 
164 Id. § 3. 
165 See id. § 4. 
166 H.B. 229 § 11. 
167 Id. § 4. 
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provision as Rep. Handy’s bill requiring forms to include a statement informing 
petitioners that providing false information is a third degree felony.168 But the 
section on penalties states that providing false information for the purpose of 
obtaining an order is only a misdemeanor.169 Interestingly, Sen. Weiler’s bill, which 
otherwise contains the strongest due process protections, provides no penalty for 
filing false information in a petition.170 
Each red flag bill introduced in the 2020 legislative session offers some 
procedural safeguards, and each could go further in some way. Overall, none of the 
bills differ greatly in this regard from those that have been passed in other states—
except for the lack of an ex parte confiscation mechanism in Sen. Weiler’s bill.171 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
Critics of red flag laws say that they “place[] judges in the unenviable—indeed, 
impossible—position of trying to predict who may and may not become a mass 
murderer.”172 Despite these concerns, red flag laws can be written in a way that is 
likely to satisfy due process requirements. To do so, states should require a showing 
of imminent danger before granting an ex parte protection order. Further, the 
simplest and perhaps most effective procedural safeguard is to require a heightened 
standard of proof by which a petitioner must show that a respondent is dangerous. 
Low standards of proof are especially problematic in states where protection orders 
do not have to be renewed periodically by the petitioner. Written carefully, red flag 
laws can simultaneously further society’s interest in preserving human life and 
safeguard an important liberty interest. 
The most recent versions of proposed red flag legislation in Utah appear to meet 
these procedural due process requirements. Although the practice of holding a 
hearing after a deprivation of liberty or property has already occurred is disfavored 
under the procedural due process requirement that hearings be held at a meaningful 
time, each bill at least requires a court to find that a respondent is imminently 
dangerous or could be in the near future before issuing ex parte protection orders. 
Senator Weiler’s bill simply does not allow postdeprivation hearings, which would 
likely protect it from any procedural due process challenge.  
As for the meaningfulness of the hearing itself, courts will weigh the interests 
at stake and consider any additional safeguards that have been included to prevent 
an erroneous deprivation. Because most courts apply intermediate scrutiny to 
Second Amendment claims, the individual liberty interest at stake is likely to be 
outweighed by the government’s interest in protecting human life. The resulting 
likelihood of constitutionality will be bolstered by the bills’ multiple additional 
 
168 H.B. 460 § 4. 
169 Id. § 11. 
170 See S.B. 246, 63rd Leg., 2020 Gen. Sess. §11 (Utah 2020), 
https://le.utah.gov/~2020/bills/static/SB0246.html [https://perma.cc/DUH4-U3YZ]. 
171 See S.B. 246 § 4. 
172 AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF R.I., supra note 87, at 4. 
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safeguards. The safeguards included in the three bills examined in this Note vary. 
The clearest improvement would be raising the standard of proof for issuing a final 
order in Rep. Briscoe’s bill.  
Overall, it appears that the Utah legislators who have sponsored red flag bills 
have taken due process concerns seriously. Policymakers and the public should rest 
assured that there is a way to enact this potentially lifesaving legislation while 
protecting the rights of all involved. 
